David Hugh-Jones
I'm an associate professor in the School of Economics at the University of East Anglia. My interests include culture, social norms, social genomics and my dog Roly.
My book Wyclif's Dust: Western Cultures from the Printing Press to the Present is out now. Read more.
Email: davidhughjones@gmail.com
Twitter: @davidhughjones
Substack: https://wyclif.substack.com
Working Papers
Trading Social Status for Genetics in Marriage Markets: Evidence from UK Biobank (with Abdel Abdellaoui, Oana Borcan and Pierre Chiappori). Source code.
If socio-economic status (SES) and genetic variants are both assets in marriage markets, then the two will become associated in spouse pairs, and will be passed on together to future generations. This process provides a new explanation for the surprising persistence of inequality across generations, and for the genes-SES gradient: the genetic differences we observe between high- and low-income people. The gradient includes differences related to human capital and to physical and mental health, so understanding its origins is important for understanding inequality in general, and health inequalities in particular. We model social-genetic assortative mating (SGAM) and test for its existence in a large genetically-informed survey. We compare spouses of individuals with different birth order, which is known to affect socio-economic status and which is exogenous to own genetic endowments among siblings. Spouses of earlier-born individuals have genetic variants that predict higher educational attainment. We provide evidence that this effect is mediated by individuals’ own educational attainment and income. Thus, environmental shocks to socio-economic status are reflected in the DNA of subsequent generations. Our work uncovers a new channel by which economic institutions can affect long-run inequality; suggests that genes-SES gradients may be historically widespread; and shows that genetic variation is endogenous to social institutions.
Existing theories of the effects of the printing press treat it as speeding up the transmission of technical knowledge. This cannot explain why a large proportion of both manuscripts and early printed books was religious. We argue that books transmit prudential and moral rules as well as technical information. These culturally transmitted rules provide a foundation for economic rationality, and solve problems of trust in large markets. In Europe, cheaper book production stimulated not only scientific progress, but also new forms of religion, which used book reading to inculcate rules appropriate to the emerging modern economy. We model the effect of the printing press on economic growth. Initially religious works dominate, but as the stock of technical knowledge grows, the proportion of technical works increases.
People’s preferences about the fair distribution of resources vary within and between different populations, and this affects many economic and political outcomes. We argue that a source of these differences is the social transmission of fairness norms from peers during adolescence. We ran an experiment on transmission of fairness norms in a friendship network of 11-15 year olds. Observing others’ choices affects young people’s fairness norms, as expressed in both their own choices and the attitudes they express. Our results show how young people can adopt redistributive norms via the social influence of their peer group. We also examine how the strength of social influence varies with friendship status and network position.
Publications
Human Capital Mediates Natural Selection in Contemporary Humans (with Abdel Abdellaoui). 2022. Behavior Genetics. Source code.
Britons are evolving to be poorer and less educated (Daily Telegraph)
Genetic correlates of social stratification in Great Britain (with Abdel Abdellaoui, Kathryn E Kemper, Yan Holtz, Michel G Nivard, Laura Veul, Loic Yengo, Brendan P Zietsch, Timothy M Frayling, Naomi Wray, Jian Yang, Karin JH Verweij, and Peter M Visscher). 2019. Nature Human Behaviour. Preprint.
Migrants from coalfields take DNA as well as talent with them (The Economist)
Brain drain is carrying our clever genes south (The Times)
British industrial regions suffer ‘gene drain’ with the healthier and more academically gifted moving away (Daily Telegraph)
Inequality now extends to people’s DNA (The Conversation)
True Lies: Comment on Garbarino, Slonim and Villeval (2018). 2019. Journal of the Economic Science Association. Source code. R package.
Humans reciprocate by discriminating against group peers (with Itay Ron and Ro'i Zultan). 2019. Evolution and Human Behavior.
Signaling by signature: The weight of international opinion and ratification of treaties by domestic veto players (with Hugh Ward and Karolina Milewicz). 2018. Political Science Research and Methods.
Intergroup revenge: a laboratory experiment (with Martin Leroch). 2017. Homo Economicus.
The logic of costly punishment reversed: expropriation of free-riders and outsiders (with Carlo Perroni). 2017. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization.
Assortative mating on educational attainment leads to genetic spousal resemblance for polygenic scores (with Karen Verweij, Beate St Pourcain and Abdel Abdellaoui). 2016. Intelligence.
Honesty, beliefs about honesty and economic growth in 15 countries. 2016. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 127: 99–114.
An experimental study on the incentives of the probabilistic serial mechanism (with Morimitsu Kurino and Christoph Vanberg). 2014. Games and Economic Behavior 87: 367–380.
Why do crises go to waste? Fiscal austerity and public service reform. 2014. Public choice 158(1-2): 209-220.
Reputation and Cooperation in Defense (with Ro'i Zultan). 2013. Journal of Conflict Resolution 57(2): 327-355
Anonymous Rituals (with David Reinstein). 2012. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 81(2): 478-489.
Motivations behind intergroup conflict: an experimental study of Greek students after the 2008 riots (with Alexia Katsanidou and Gerhard Riener). 2011. International Journal of Conflict and Violence 5:2.
Explaining Institutional Change: Why Elected Politicians Implement Direct Democracy. 2011. In Creative Crises of Democracy, eds. de Jong and Gijsenbergh, Brussels: Peter Lang.
Comment on David Sanders et al., 'Simulating the Effects of the Alternative Vote in the 2010 UK General Election'. 2011. Parliamentary Affairs 64:4.
Constitutions and Policy Comparisons. 2009. Journal of Theoretical Politics 21(1): 25-61.
Sophisticated Voting on Competing Ballot Measures: Spatial Theory and Evidence. 2010. British Journal of Political Science 40(2): 399-418.
© David Hugh-Jones 2007-2022. All rights reserved.